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Extended Results for Partisanship
In the analysis in the latter part of the paper, we pooled surveys taken close to t 0 and to t 1 to determine the impact of establishing a local presence on levels of partisanship. The surveys we used were mostly obtained from CESOP, a repository of survey data maintained by UNICAMP. Two surges, however, were obtained directly from Datafolha. 
Supplemental Materials
One of the specifications we presented in Table 3 in the main paper required computation of substantive effects from hierarchical logit estimates, and their standard errors. These were computed by parametric bootstrapping for a hypothetical municipality with "average random effects," following roughly the algorithm of Clarify (Tomz, Wittenberg & King 2003) , but also accounting for the random effects. We first drew 1000 thousand hypothetical coefficients from a multivariate normal distribution with mean equal to the estimated fixed effects coefficients and variance obtained from the estimated variance-covariance matrix of the fixed effects. We then computed predicted effects for each of these one thousand simulations, by computed predicted probabilities for treatment and control groups in t 0 and t 1 . In each of these cases, we added the contribution of the average random effects. The result was a distribution of 1000 simulated predicted effects, from which we computed the point estimate reported in the table (the mean of the distribution), the standard error (the SE of the distribution), and the p-value (the share of the 1000 simulations smaller or equal to zero). This distribution of simulated predicted effects was skewed positively, therefore even though the standard errors are high relative to the average effect, the effect is significantly different from zero at a relatively high confidence level.
As with the analysis for electoral performance, in the main paper we also report only baseline levels and effects of establishing a local branch. Here ( 
Details and Extended Results for the Civil Society Connection
In Figures 3a and 3b we report results from regressions similar to the those reported in Table A.4, but which include an interaction of the "treatment" with the pre-existing level of civil society density in each municipality.
Our indicator of civil society density was defined as the log number of relevant civil society entities per capita in each municipality. We computed this indicator from a census of non-profits carried out by the (main body of the paper), and A.1. Estimates were obtained from a DiD logit with random effects by municipality and the addition of (log of) civil society density in a three way interaction with treatment and time, and all lower dimension interaction terms. Effects were computed by parametric bootstrapping. 
